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FOCUSED DISCUSSION PEER-REVIEWED
Evolution, Intelligent Design, and Public
Education




Thomas Nagel recently proposed that the exclusion of Intelligent
Design from science classrooms is inappropriate and that there
needs to be room for “noncommittal discussion.” It is shown
that Nagel’s policy proposals do not fit the conclusions of his
arguments.
In “Public Education and Intelligent Design,” Thomas Nagel (2008)
argues against Judge Jones’s ruling in Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School
District. In Dover, the court struck down the Dover school district’s
requirement that biology teachers in its public schools inform students
about intelligent design (ID); the court reasoned that the district’s
requirement violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution owing to the fact that “the religious nature
of ID would be readily apparent to an objective observer, adult or child”
(2005, 718).
Nagel’s argument proceeds in two stages. The first is a philosophical
argument to the effect that Dover relies upon a spurious demarcation
between science and nonscience; according to Nagel, “either both of them
[i.e., evolution and ID] are science or neither of them is” (2008, 201-2).
Second, Nagel proposes a policy argument indicating that a “noncommittal
discussion of some of the issues would be preferable” (2008, 205) to
Jones’s ruling that it is “unconstitutional to teach ID as an alternative to
evolution in a public school science classroom” (2005, 765).
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Although we believe that Nagel’s philosophical argument does not
succeed, we will not focus on that at this time. Instead, we want to
draw attention to a few incongruities between Nagel’s philosophical
argument and his policy suggestions. More specifically, we shall argue
that the success of Nagel’s philosophical argument warrants policy
recommendations far more radical than the ones he endorses; in fact,
the success of the philosophical argument warrants policies that Nagel
explicitly hopes to resist.
We begin with a sketch of Nagel’s philosophical argument. The Dover
ruling identifies three distinct grounds upon which ID fails to be a science:
We find that ID fails on three different levels, any one of which
is sufficient to determine that ID is not a science. They are:
(1) ID violates the centuries-old rules of science by invoking
and permitting supernatural causation; (2) the argument of
irreducible complexity, central to ID, employs the same flawed
and illogical contrived dualism that doomed creation science
in the 1980’s; and (3) ID’s negative attacks on evolution have
been refuted by the scientific community. (2005, 735)
Nagel rejects the first and third claims, arguing that they occasion the
following dilemma:
Either [the critic of ID] admits that the intervention of. . . a
designer is possible or he does not. If he does not, he must
explain why that belief is more scientific than the belief that
a designer is possible. If on the other hand he believes that
a designer is possible, then he can argue that the evidence
is overwhelmingly against such a designer, but he cannot say
that someone who offers evidence on the other side is doing
something of a fundamentally different kind. (2008, 195)
Nagel contends that opponents of ID must argue either that (1) ID is
not a science because an intervening designer is impossible, or that (2) ID
is science, but completely undermined by the evidence.
According to Nagel, the first horn of the dilemma is unpromising. The
rejection of supernatural design as a possible explanation of life is itself
either an empirical or nonempirical thesis. The belief that a supernatural
designer is impossible cannot be confirmed by empirical evidence. Yet if
the belief is held without empirical justification, there is no reason to take it
to be a scientific claim, but rather a “basic, ungrounded assumption about
how the world works” (2008, 194).
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Thus the ID opponent must grasp the second horn of the dilemma
and argue that although a supernatural designer is possible, the evidence
is overwhelmingly, indeed conclusively, against it. But this puts the ID
opponents in a difficult position. For they now admit that whether or not
ID is scientific is a matter of looking at the evidence, and there is good
reason to believe that the evidence against a supernatural designer is not
conclusive. To make this point, Nagel turns to Michael Behe’s argument
that random mutation is not sufficient to explain the rate or direction
of variation necessary for natural selection to have yielded some of its
most successful outcomes (Behe 2007, 165). Nagel claims that Behe’s
thesis “seems on the face of it a scientific claim, about what the evidence
suggests, and one that is not self-evidently absurd” (2008, 192). If a
designer is not ruled out a priori, then there is legitimate scientific question
as to whether the evidence points to the existence of one. And given that
those working in ID present their cases with empirical evidence, Nagel
argues that “whatever the merits. . . , [it] is clearly a scientific disagreement,
not a disagreement between science and something else” (2008, 197).
Nagel’s dilemma, then, purports to show that evolution and ID are
“symmetrical positions,” in that “either both conclusions are rendered
nonscientific by the influence of their nonscientific assumptions or are
both scientific in spite of their assumptions” (2008, 197). Either way, the
exclusion of ID from the science curriculum on the basis of its alleged
nonscientific status is unjustified: If neither is scientific, then teaching one
while prohibiting the other has the effect of promoting a religious view. In
the case of teaching evolution without ID, we “contravene the requirement
of religious neutrality” because evolution depends “on a view, atheism
or theistic noninterventionism, that falls clearly in the domain of religious
belief” (Nagel 2008, 201).
Hence Nagel insists that space should be made somewhere in
the public school curriculum–not necessarily in biology classes (2008,
204)–for “noncommittal discussion” (2008, 205) of the debates among
evolutionists and the proponents of ID.
For educational policy, however, this conclusion is in several respects
curious. First it should be noted that Nagel’s conclusion is a good deal
more modest than his argument would warrant. If indeed “either both
of them are science or neither of them is” (2008, 201-2), why should
anyone settle for merely a “noncommittal discussion” of the issues? First,
it is not clear what exactly a “noncommittal discussion” of the issues
would entail, especially for high school students, for whom the details
are not yet understood. We have argued elsewhere (forthcoming) that
discussions under these conditions usually tend to polarize rather than
educate participants. Second, given that Nagel holds that “either both
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of them are science or neither of them is,” why not insist that ID must
be included in the biology curriculum whenever evolution is? Why not
insist on equal lesson time for both views? Why not leave it up to the
individual school districts to decide? Alternatively, why not argue that both
ID and evolution should be banned from the biology curriculum? Nagel’s
argument, were it to succeed, insists that either both or neither must be
taught in a biology class.
Nagel attempts to avoid this result by introducing the distinction
between bad science and nonscience (2008, 198). His argument infers
that although ID is not nonscience, it is bad science, and thus need not be
taught in biology any more than the Ptolemaic system need be taught in
astronomy. But it is not clear if this distinction has any weight in the current
case, for it is not clear whether the good/bad science distinction is any
more tractable on purely empirical grounds than the science/nonscience
distinction. Surely ID theorists deny that their view is bad science; indeed,
their view is that evolution is bad science. If Nagel is correct that ID is
not nonscience then there is no reason for the ID proponents to eschew
the more ambitious conclusion: ID must be taught, it must be taught in
biology class specifically, and it may be taught to the exclusion of evolution.
In short, the modesty of Nagel’s conclusion cannot be sustained if his
arguments succeed.
Second, consider that Nagelian arguments could be employed mutatis
mutandis to other academic disciplines. Take physics, for example.
Surely the Newtonian mechanics taught in high school physics classes
presupposes the truth of certain metaphysical propositions, such as
that material objects exist over time. Physics therefore proceeds on the
nonscientific assumptions that (1) material things exist, and (2) material
things causally interact over time. The falsities of Berkeleyan idealism and
Malebranche’s occasionalism are therefore presupposed by high school
physics. Hence a Nagelian dilemma: either the falsities of idealism and
occasionalism (and their respective theological views) are themselves
an empirically demonstrable thesis or they are not. If they are not, then
Newtonian mechanics is simply a disguised theology; if they are, then
room must be made for consideration of the evidence for and against
temporally persisting material things. And we’re off to the races, but this
time in a physics classroom.
Finally, note that the prepared statement prohibited by the Dover
decision invites students to discuss “the Origins of Life” (Nagel 2008,
187) with their families. One is left to wonder what the capitalizations
are meant to signify. In any case, given his arguments, Nagel should,
like Judge Jones, oppose such a statement as overtly religious. Recall
that the fulcrum of Nagel’s argument is that if evolution is scientific then
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so is ID. If ID is, as Nagel alleges, a scientific account of biological life,
why should students be instructed to discuss the matter with their parents,
rather than, say, a biologist? The invitation to discuss the matter with one’s
parents, who might not have any special training or expertise in any area of
science, is an unspoken concession that the questions evolutionary theory
attempts to answer are ultimately not scientific questions at all, but rather
questions of the sort best left to individuals and their families–questions
of conscience, tradition, and spirituality. Otherwise, students would have
been encouraged to ask further questions from biologists or other
scientists as well. Accordingly, the statement that lies at the heart of the
Dover decision is at odds with Nagel’s own view of the matter.
The more general problem is that Nagel’s arguments provide
support for equal-time and possibly even more radical policies. Although
Nagel’s stated conclusion is, in the end, modest and perhaps even
unobjectionable–few would deny that it would be a good thing to
make room somewhere in the high school curriculum for discussion of
this controversy–his arguments against Dover warrant much stronger
conclusions than Nagel intends. That is, despite the modesty of
Nagel’s conclusion, many will draw more ambitious results from Nagel’s
arguments: Evolution is just a religion; no different from other religious
views of life, with no claim to any special status, and so on. Nagel thus
lends credence to policy proposals that are even more disturbing than













39 Spontaneous Generations 3:1(2009)








Aikin, Scott, Michael Harbour, and Robert B. Talisse. Nagel on Public Education
and Intelligent Design. Journal of Philosophical Research (forthcoming).
Behe, Michael. 2007. The Edge of Evolution. New York: Free Press.
Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District. 400 F. Supp 2nd 707 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
Nagel, Thomas. 2008. Public Education and Intelligent Design. Philosophy &
Public Affairs 36, no. 2: 187-205.
40 Spontaneous Generations 3:1(2009)
